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Executive Summary 
 
Educational inequalities emerge even before children start school. They remain pronounced in the 
years of compulsory schooling. Of particular concern are the test score differences associated with 
family background. Data from the OECD PISA study shows that test score gaps vary systematically 
by family background across countries with very different education systems.  
 
Educational disadvantages acquired during schooling (and pre-school) strongly impact on whether 
an individual participates in post-compulsory education. OECD data shows that in many countries 
the percent of individuals who complete teritiary education is far higher if their parents also have 
tertiary education. Furthermore, educational inequalities do not stop growing when people have 
completed  their  full-time  education.  Data  from  many  countries  show  that  the  probability  of 
undertaking non-formal job-related education is higher for those who already have higher levels 
of education.  
 
What is the role of policy in reducing these attainment gaps? While policies at all stages of the 
lifecycle are relevant, we focus on a review of evidence about school-level policies in England. This 
is  because  the  years  of  compulsory  schooling  are  a  very  important  time  for  government 
intervention in a way that potentially affects all students. Also, there is a body of good evaluation 
research  of  school-level  policies  in  England  in  recent  years.  We  review  evidence  under  the 
following headings: the  efficacy  of  school  resources;  market  incentives;  school  autonomy and 
pedagogical approaches for raising educational attainment in schools.  
 
The evaluation challenge with regard to school resources is that additional resources are often 
disproportionately  allocated  to  disadvantaged  students.  Unless  this  is  fully  dealt  with  in  the 
methodological design, one can easily estimate a relationship than is too low. There have been 
several recent studies looking at this issue for England using a census of all pupils (the National 
Pupil  Database).  In  general,  the  studies  suggest  a  modest  positive  effect  of  additional  school 
resources. However, the most recent study (Gibbons et al. 2011) suggest that the effect could be 
much larger – at least for students in disadvantaged, urban areas. In fact, most of these studies 
suggest that school expenditure has a larger effect on disadvantaged students. This is good news 
for policies like the Pupil Premium, although it also suggests that cuts to school expenditure are an 
important concern. 
 
Over  the  last  thirty  years,  there  has  been  a  concerted  effort  to  increase  parental  choice, 
competition between schools and accountability for the performance of children. The evidence on 
school choice suggests that it does not offer the same advantages to those from lower and higher 
socio-economic groups. This is largely because parents from lower socio-economic groups cannot 
afford to live close to a very popular school. When schools are over-subscribed, proximity to the 
school is of key importance. Thus, school choice (although good in itself) does not help to reduce 
socio-economic  gaps  in  educational  achievement.  Furthermore,  school  competition  does  not 
appear to improve educational attainment.   
 
One reason why school competition may not be effective is because schools do not have enough 
autonomy for their day-to-day organization. In some countries, more independent states schools 
have been allowed to emerge. The rationale is that this greater autonomy will encourage more 
innovative policies in schools and help to raise standards. In England, these schools are called 
‘academies’ and they were originally established as a replacement for a failing secondary school in 
an  area  of  disadvantage.  Evaluation  evidence  suggests  that  these  schools  started  to  perform 
better  and  also helped to  boost  the  performance  of  neighbouring  schools.  As  the policy  was 
initially introduced to disadvantaged areas, it has been an instrument to reduce the attainment 
gap along the socio-economic dimension (when viewed at a national level). However, one has to 
be careful about any projection of effects from a relatively small number of schools that became 
academies  over  this  time  period.  Schools  that  are  currently  enrolling  on  the  Academies 
Programme have very different characteristics (e.g. on average they are less disadvantaged at 
baseline). Furthermore, the expansion of the programme presents new challenges – for example, 
for monitoring and accountability; for small schools; for services traditionally provided by Local 
Authorities to all schools in their area.  
 
Whereas school autonomy seems to have become a popular concept in England since 2000, this is 
not true of some aspects of school organisation. For example, the National Literacy and Numeracy 
Strategies  were  very  prescriptive  measures  to  raise  standards  in  literacy  and  numeracy  via 
pedagogical methods. These Strategies were introduced in the late Nineties but preceded by the 
‘National  Literacy  Project’  and  ‘National  Numeracy  Project’  respectively.  The  fact  that  these 
‘projects’  were  not  implemented  across  all  Local  Authorities  has  given  researchers  scope  to 
evaluate their effectiveness (by comparing schools where the ‘literacy hour’ and ‘numeracy hour’ 
were implemented relative to schools in a comparison group before and after the policy was 
introduced). Evaluation evidence suggests that these pedagogical approaches were an extremely 
effective way to raise pupil achievement at a low cost. However, there is still a hard core of 
students for whom generic pedagogical approaches are not sufficient. One-to-one programmes 
such as ‘Reading Recovery’ have been shown to be very effective for these students. However, 
they are expensive programmes and need to be carefully targeted. Moreover, evidence is needed 
on the long-term effects of such programmes to help guide future investment decisions.  
 
England offers a useful setting for policy evaluation in education. A large number of policies have 
been implemented and at least some of these have been rigorously evaluated. There is evidence 
to  suggest  that  policies  can  be  effective  in  reducing  (or  reinforcing)  socio-economic  gaps  in 
educational achievement. Thus, we should not regard large socio-economic gaps as inevitable. 
This partly has to do with the choices that are made in educational policy. 
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One key feature of the English education system since the 1988 Education Act has been the 
design  and  implementation  of  a  number  of  educational  policies  aimed  at  improving 
educational standards and achievement.
2 There have been a range of policies introduced at 
all stages of education, and by now there have been a number of evaluations of these 
policies. 
 
In this paper we take the opportunity to critically appraise these evaluations and consider 
the scope that different policies have had to influence educational achievement. There are 
now  evaluations  of  policies  aimed  at  different  ways  of  trying  to  enhance  educational 
performance and/or reduce educational inequalities. Thus, we think it is timely to consider 
these together, with an aim to develop a better understanding of which kinds of evaluations 
have been successful and what kinds of policies have delivered education improvements in 
England. 
 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  the  next  Section,  we  describe  educational 
inequalities at different stages of the education sequence as a means of motivating the 
need for implementation of education policies and for their evaluation. Section 3 focuses in 




2. Educational Inequalities 
 
 
Inequalities in educational achievement can be identified at different points throughout 
individuals' lives. Indeed, inequalities in education emerge early in the lifecycle and gaps can 
and do widen as the education sequence progresses. These inequalities are described in this 
Section  of  the  paper,  with  an  aim  to  use  them  as  motivation  for  why  evaluation  of 
                                                 
2 See Machin and Vignoles (2005) for a description of some of these policies and education reforms. 2 
educational policies aimed at alleviating educational inequalities and reducing achievement 
gaps  is  an  important  research  area  in  the  education  field.  The  description  we  offer  is 
ordered by the education sequence that individuals follow, beginning with the pre-school 
years,  moving  through  the  years  of  compulsory  schooling,  then  on  to  post-compulsory 
education and finally to adult, or lifelong, learning. 
 
 
Pre-school education gaps 
 
By now it is well known that gaps in educational achievement are present even before 
children start school. The environments in which they grow up, and their family background, 
means that children enter school with differing levels of cognitive (and non-cognitive) skills. 
Consider the vocabulary skills of five year olds in the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), as 
reported in Table 1.
3 The Table (taken from Dustmann et al, 2010) breaks down the MCS 
vocabulary test by gender and ethnicity. The test scores have been standardised to have a 
mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10, so it is evident from the dispersion in the 
numbers in the Table that sizeable gaps in vocabulary skills exist  by gender and  across 





The gaps seen at school entry evolve through the years of compulsory schooling. Some gaps 
widen and others narrow as children's abilities at school lead them to move up or down the 
distribution  of  educational  outcomes.  This,  of  course,  can  be  affected  by  educational 
policies that have scope to affect educational achievement. 
 
Educational inequalities remain pronounced in the years of compulsory schooling. Consider 
Figure 1, which shows one example of educational inequality, namely test score differences 
associated  with  family  background.  The  Figure  shows  reading  test  score  differences 
                                                 
3 The MCS is a longitudinal survey of around 19,000 children born in the UK over a twelve month period from 
2000 to 2001. The first survey took place when the children were around nine months old. Follow-up interviews 
have, at the time of writing, taken place when  children were aged three, five and seven. 3 
associated with a one unit increase in the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status 
(ESCS) for 15 year olds in thirty nine countries, based upon data from the 2009 Programme 
of International Student Assessment (PISA).
4 The test scores have a mean of 500 and a 
standard deviation of 100 and the mean score varies significantly by country (as shown on 
the y-axis of the Figure). In all countries, however, there is a significant positive association 
between family background measured by the ESCS index and test scores. The mean impact 
of a unit increase in the index is 38 across countries (i.e. 38 percent of a standard deviation) 
and the range of estimates goes from 17 (Indonesia) to 52 (New Zealand).  The striking 
finding from the PISA data is that test score gaps systematically vary by family background in 






Educational disadvantages acquired in the years of pre-school and compulsory schooling 
strongly impinge on whether individuals participate in post-compulsory tertiary education. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of individuals who complete tertiary education in thirteen 
countries broken down by the level of their parents' education. The lightest bar corresponds 
to parents with the lowest level of education (ISCED 0-2, those with completed education at 
pre-primary, primary or upper secondary level) and the darkest to those with the highest 
level (ISCED 5-6, those with a completed tertiary education). The gaps are sizeable and show 
a consistent pattern across all the countries in the Figure - the percent of individuals who 
complete tertiary education is far higher if their parents also have a tertiary education. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The PISA ESCS index is derived from the following variables: the International Socio-Economic Index of 
Occupational Status (ISEI); the highest level of education of the student’s parents, converted into years of 
schooling; the PISA index of family wealth; the PISA index of home educational resources; and the PISA index 
of possessions related to “classical” culture in the family home. The variable is scaled to have a mean zero and a 
standard deviation of one, so the numbers in the Figure can be read as a percent of a standard deviation. See 




Educational inequalities do not stop increasing when individuals  complete their full-time 
education. They also tend to widen for adults in their working lives as adult education and 
training occurs more for those who already have higher education levels. This is shown in 
Figure 3, which shows the percentage of adults in twenty eight countries who received non-
formal job-related education in  2007 by education level. In all cases, this percentage is 





This Section makes it evident that educational inequalities emerge and persist at all stages 
of the education sequence. Some educational achievement gaps widen out as individuals 
progress  further  through  the  education  sequence,  especially  those  connected  to 
disadvantage. Thus, there is a significant need for careful evaluation of educational policies 
that are designed to try to affect inequalities in education. The raft of education policies 
introduced to the English education system in the last fifteen years or so offer a very good 
setting to consider such evaluation methods, and their success (or otherwise) in enabling us 
to gain a better understanding of what works in education, and this is what we consider in 
the next Section of this paper. 
 
 
3. Policy Evaluation Relating to Schools in England 
 
 
Although  policies  at  all  stages  of  the  lifecycle  are  relevant  for  improving  educational 
attainment  and  reducing  inequality,  in  this  Section  we  focus  on  school-level  policies  in 
England. This is because the years of compulsory schooling are a very important time for 5 
government intervention in a way that potentially affects all students.
5 It is also because, in 
addition, there is a body of good evaluation research of school-level policies in England in 
recent years. We need to be selective of policy areas to be able to offer a rigorous critical 
appraisal and so we therefore have chosen to discuss policies and their evaluation under the 
following headings: the efficacy of school resources; market incentives; school autonomy; 





One of the perennial debates in the economics of education literature is whether additional 
school expenditure has an effect on raising pupil attainment. It is also important to ask 
whether such policies can be implemented in a way to reduce the kinds of attainment gaps 
discussed earlier. 
 
The  relevant  question  is  not  about  spending  per  se  (which  of  course  is  necessary)  but 
whether additional spending can be cost effective at the typical levels found in developed 
countries. Internationally, there are many studies about school expenditure but there are 
different views about how to best interpret results. Hanushek (2008), for example, argues 
that accumulated research suggests no clear, systematic relationship between resources 
and student outcomes. However, others place more weight on studies with a particularly 
strong methodological design that show positive effects (e.g. the class size studies of Angrist 
and Lavy, 1999; Krueger, 1999; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001).  
 
The  difficult  empirical  issue  in  this  area  is  that  additional  school  resources  are  often 
disproportionately allocated to disadvantaged students. Unless this is fully dealt with in the 
methodological  design,  the  relationship  between  resources  and  attainment  is  easily 
obscured. The positive association between school resources and educational disadvantage 
is counter-balanced against the negative association between educational disadvantage and 
educational  attainment.  The  net  result  can  easily  be  an  observed  association  between 
school resources and educational attainment that is too low and does not reflect the true 
                                                 
5 Students are not forced to attend pre-primary education or to stay in education beyond age 16. The compulsory 
years of education are the only time that government education policies can potentially affect all students. 6 
causal  relationship.
6  It  is  very  difficult  to  prove  that  this  particular  problem  has  been 
overcome,  particularly  where  it  is  not  possible  to  implement  randomised  controlled 
experiments. Yet as the third biggest category of government expenditure (in the UK)
7, it is 
important to get a sense of whether an increase or a reduction of spending is likely to affect 
student outcomes – which are so important for the future of the economy as well as for the 
individual’s future prosperity. 
 
There have been several recent studies looking at this issue for English using a census of all 
pupils  (the  National  Pupil  Database)  and  expenditure  data  for  all  schools.  The  English 
National  Curriculum  is  divided  into  four  ‘key  stages’,  at  the  end  of  which  students  are 
evaluated by their teachers (at age 7 and 14) or they undertake national tests that are 
externally set and marked to the school (at age 11 and 16). Two studies that evaluate the 
relationship between expenditure and attainment in secondary school are by Levăcić et al. 
(2005) and Jenkins et al. (2006). They look at outcomes at age 14 (end of Key Stage 3) and 
age  16  (end  of  Key  Stage  4)  respectively.  Both  studies  find  a  small  positive  effect  of 
resources on pupil attainment. A difficulty is that they use political control as an instrument 
for school expenditure. This involves making the assumption that political control of a Local 
Authority  only  influences  pupil-level  outcomes  through  school  expenditure.  However, 
Holmlund et al. (2008) show that changes in political control are correlated with changes in 
the demographic characteristics of Local Authorities, even when the sample is restricted to 
Local Authorities where the election outcome is ‘close’ and there is a small difference in the 
share of seats of the two largest parties.  
 
Government initiatives have provided a better framework to examine causal effects in this 
context. Machin et al. (2004, 2010) evaluate a flagship policy of the Labour government in 
the early 2000s – the Excellence in Cities (EiC) programme for English secondary schools. In 
this programme, schools in disadvantaged, mainly urban, areas of England were given extra 
resources to try to improve standards.  Initially most of the funding was directed at core 
strands (Learning Support Units; Learning Mentors; a Gifted and Talented Programme). Over 
time, schools were allowed greater flexibility in how to use the funding. The methodological 
approach is based on ‘differences-in-differences’, where schools in the ‘treatment group’ 
                                                 
6 Holmlund et al. (2010) illustrate that this is an important concern in an English context. 
7 This refers to education spending as a whole, although most education spending is at school-level. 7 
were compared to schools in appropriately defined comparison group before and after the 
policy came into effect.  Similarly to the study by Levăcić et al. (2005), they find evidence for 
small average effects of additional resources for maths but not for English.  
 
The studies looking at resource effects for primary schools (Gibbons et al, 2011; Holmlund 
et  al.  2010)  find  that  effects  are  substantially  higher  for  economically  disadvantaged 
students.  For secondary schools, both Machin et al. (2010) and Levăcić et al. (2005) find 
that resource effects are higher for disadvantaged students (although this is not found by 
Jenkins et al, 2006).  These findings are encouraging for policy because they suggest that 
mechanisms  have  been  in  place  to  ensure  that  disadvantaged  students  benefit 
disproportionately from increasing school resources. This helps to reduce the attainment 
gap between socio-economic groups from what it might otherwise be. On the other hand, it 
is interesting that both Machin et al. (2010) and Levăcić et al. (2005) find that high ability 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds are most likely to benefit from these policies. 
Machin et al. (2010) highlight a particular group of concern  – low ability students from 
disadvantaged  backgrounds.  These  are  ‘hard  to  reach’  students  who  may  require  more 
resource-intensive programmes.  Another important question is what to make of an effect 
that appears to be small (at least on average). Levăcić et al. (2005) find that spending £100 
more per pupil would raise maths attainment by 0.04 of a level whereas Machin et al. 
(2011) find that spending £120 more per pupil raises maths attainment only by 0.01 of a 
level (after about 3 years of the policy).
8 Bradley and Taylor (2010) look at whether the 
same policy (Excellence in Cities) and the ‘Specialist Schools’ policy had an effect on student 
outcomes at age 16.
9 They also report evidence of only modest effects.  
 
To conduct an accurate Cost-Benefit Analysis, we need information both on costs and how 
estimated  educational  benefits  translate  into  a  range  of  later  outcomes  –  for  example, 
further education, probability of employment, wages, crime. Generally, it is not difficult to 
estimate the costs of a policy. However, it is often difficult to estimate future benefits. In 
the absence good information, Machin et al. (2010) ask how much the average benefits in 
                                                 
8  In  the  Key  Stage  attainment  tests,  progress  is  measured  in  ‘levels’.  At  each  Key  Stage,  the  National 
Curriculum defines the level at which students are expected to achieve. In the Key Stage 3 test (i.e. the test used 
in Levăcić et al. (2005)  and Machin et al. (2011)), most children achieve within the range of levels 3-8. 
9 Specialist schools are state-maintained secondary schools with a designated subject specialism. They need to 
apply for specialist status and, if successful, receive significant additional funding.  8 
terms of exam achievement would have to translate into higher wages for the policy to 
break-even. In line with the literature, they assume an average rate of return to a year of 
schooling to be about 8 per cent. Using the Family Resources Survey data for England and 
Wales, they obtain a wage profile (an average of weekly earnings by age, for all individuals). 
If pupils were to obtain the equivalent benefit of a whole year of education at age 14 and 
then started work at age 16, the lifetime benefit of this extra year is estimated to be about 
£20,000.
10 According to the National Curriculum a one level improvement corresponds to 
about 2 years of schooling. If this is true, the benefit of EiC is about 0.02 of a year of 
schooling (i.e. 0.01 x 2) – which comes to about £400 over the lifetime (i.e. 0.02 x £20,000). 
This is very similar to the cost of EiC policy (£120 x 3). This very simple analysis suggests that 
EiC  policy  breaks  even  if  improvement  in  Key  Stage  3  results  corresponds  to  years  of 
schooling in the way suggested by the National Curriculum. Even if this is way off the mark, 
benefits of improved attendance at school and higher achievement at age 14 may lead to 
economic  benefits  in  the  short  and  long  term  that  we  do  not  observe  –  for  example, 
increased  probability  of  staying  on  at  school  beyond  compulsory  school-leaving,  higher 
probability of employment, lower probability of turning to crime.  
 
There have been two recent papers about the effects of school expenditure in primary 
schools (Holmlund et al. 2010; Gibbons et al. 2011). Holmlund et  al. (2010) use the National 
Pupil Database between 2002 and 2007  – a period of time in which there was a large 
increase in school expenditure in England. They find evidence of a consistently positive 
effect of expenditure across subjects. The magnitude is a little bigger than that found for 
secondary schools but still modest. Gibbons et al. (2011) uses a very different strategy than 
that used for other papers and the study applies to schools in urban areas that are close to 
Local Authority boundaries. The percentage of poor children in these schools is much higher 
than the national average (28% are eligible to receive free school meals, compared to 16% 
nationally). The strategy uses the fact that closely neighbouring schools with similar pupil 
intakes  can  receive  markedly  different  levels  of  core  funding  if  they  are  in  different 
education authorities. This is because of an anomaly in the funding formula which provides 
an  ‘area  cost  adjustment’ to  compensate  for differences  in  labour  costs  between  areas 
                                                 
10 The estimated benefit is calculated based on the weekly earnings of all individuals in the Family Resources 
Survey  (2002/03) between the age of 16 and 64. The Net Present Value of an extra year of schooling at age 14 
is then calculated using a discount rate of 3.5% - the recommended discount rate in the UK HM Treasury Green 
Book (http://greenbook.treasury.gov.uk).   9 
whereas in reality teachers are drawn from the same labour market and are paid according 
to  national  pay  scales.  The  study  shows  that  schools  on  either  side  of  Local  Authority 
boundaries receive different levels of funding and that this is associated with a sizeable 
differential in pupil achievement at the end of primary school. For example, for an extra 
£1,000 of spending, the effect is equivalent to moving 19% of students currently achieving 
the  expected  level  (or  grade)  in  Maths  (level  4)  to  the  top  grade  (level  5)  and  31%  of 
students currently achieving level 3 to level 4 (the expected grade at this age, according to 
the National Curiculum). Bearing in mind that a one level improvement in the National 
Curriculum has been interpreted as equivalent to two years of schooling (discussed above) 
and that each extra year of schooling has an estimated benefit over the lifetime of £20,000, 
the cost of additional school resources can be easily justified in a cost-benefit framework.  
 
 Taken together, the papers suggest that there is important heterogeneity in the effects of 
pupil expenditure with stronger effects in poorer areas (which is good for reducing the 
attainment gap between socio-economic groups). They suggest that school resources can, in 







Over the last thirty years, there has been a concerted effort to increase parental choice, 
competition between schools and accountability of schools for the performance of children. 
If the ‘market’ works well, parents should be able to make an informed choice about what 
school to send their child and schools should have an incentive to improve performance 
because their funding is linked strongly to pupil numbers and information is made available 
to  parents  through  the  accountability  framework  (school  inspections  and  publication  of 
‘league tables’ of school performance).  
 
                                                 
11  In  education,  nominal  spending  is  staying  constant  (apart  from  the  ‘pupil  premium’).  However,  simple 
calculations suggest that even schools benefiting from the ‘pupil premium’ will experience a real decrease in 
funding because of high inflation.  10 
Legislation from the 1980s has enabled parents to apply to any state school. Schools are 
only permitted to discriminate if there is over-subscription and according to an enforced 
Code of Practice. The most important over-subscription criteria is usually proximity to the 
school. Evidence that parents act on available information in making these choices is shown 
in the literature relating school quality to house prices. In England, the positive relationship 
between school quality and house prices is shown by Gibbons and Machin (2003), Rosenthal 
(2003) and Gibbons et al. (2009).
12 Burgess et al. (2009) also show that academic standards 
are important in both parents’ stated and revealed preferences for school choice. Of course, 
the  link  between  choice  and  parental  income  means  that  many  parents  are  unable  to 
exercise meaningful choice because of their lower income (i.e. they cannot afford to live 
very close to a popular school). Furthermore, West and Pennell (1999) show that higher 
socio-economic groups have better information and understanding of school performance. 
Thus, ‘school choice’ (although good in itself) does not offer the same advantages to those 
from lower and higher socio-economic groups. It does not help to address attainment gaps 
by family background. 
 
Parental choice and incentives for schools to perform well should give rise to competition 
between  schools.  In  the  international  literature,  there  have  been  many  attempts  to 
investigate whether increased competition gives rise to improved educational attainment. 
However, the international evidence is ‘voluminous and mixed’ (Gibbons et al. 2008) and 
there  are few  papers  in  England.    Bradley  et al.  (2001)  look  at this at  school-level  (for 
secondary  schools)  and  find  that  schools  with  the  best  examination  performance  have 
grown  more  quickly.  They  argue  that  increased  competition  between  schools  led  to 
improved exam performance. The first pupil-level analysis on this subjects relates to primary 
schools in the South East of England (Gibbons et al. 2008). The authors find no relationship 
between the extent of school choice in an area and pupil performance. The study also 
suggests that there is no causal relationship between measures of school competition and 
pupils’  educational  attainment.  The  only  case  where  choice  and  competition  might  be 
beneficial  is  in  the  case  of  faith  schools.
13  This  might  because  many  faith  schools  are 
                                                 
12  See reviews of the wider literature in Black and  Machin (2010) and Machin (2011). 
13 Faith primary schools are attended by about a fifth of all pupils. One third are Catholic Schools (voluntary 
aided) and two-thirds are Church of England schools (under more direct control from the Local Authority), with 
a very small number of schools aiming to educate children of other faiths. Such schools can only discriminate 11 
voluntary  aided  and  have  great  autonomy  than  other  state  schools  (e.g.  there  is  less 
representation from the Local Authority on the board of governors; they control their own 
admissions, although they must adhere to the Code of Practice). Therefore in might be the 
case that competition would play a more important role in school performance if schools 





In most countries, state schools operate within a framework imposed on them by their 
jurisdiction in terms of rules about teacher pay and conditions, admissions, the curriculum, 
composition of the governing body and so on.  In some countries, more independent state 
schools have been allowed to emerge. For example, there are ‘charter schools’ in the US, 
‘free schools’ in Sweden and ‘academies’ in England (since the year 2000). The details vary 
between countries but in all cases, the  general idea is that a new school type emerges 
where schools that are funded by the state are given more autonomy than the typical state 
schools in how they are allowed to operate.
14 The rationale is that this greater autonomy 
will encourage more innovative policies in schools and help to raise standards. They may 
also increase competition between schools in the local area, thereby raising attainment. 
 
In England, ‘academies’ are managed by their sponsors and any governors they appoint. 
They have responsibility for employing all staff, agreeing pay and conditions, freedom over 
most of the curriculum (except for core subjects) and all aspects of school organisation. 
Originally, academies were established as a replacement for a failing secondary school in an 
area of economic disadvantage.  Details of how the system operated are well documented 
by Wilson (2011). More recently the nature of the academies programme has changed with 
the  prospect  of  becoming  an  academy  school  becoming  much  more  widely  available. 
                                                                                                                                                        
by religion in the event of over-subscription. As a result, many of these schools have a significant minority of 
children from other faith traditions than their own. 
14  See  Machin  and  Vernoit  (2011)  for  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  how  greater  autonomy  exists  in  one 
particular type of these newer kinds of schools, academies in the English secondary school sector.  In a nutshell, 
there is more autonomy as compared to a traditional state school in that there is less control from the Local 
Authority, as admissions and teacher hiring are under school control, governing bodies are both more diverse 
and have more responsibility for school polices and the curriculum followed can be more broadly defined (as 
the National Curriculum is only followed in english, maths, science and ICT). 12 
Machin and Vernoit (2010) show that schools that have recently expressed an interest in 
converting to an academy are characterised by a more advantaged student intake (e.g. a 
lower proportion eligible to receive free school meals) and higher educational attainment. 
 
Machin and Vernoit (2011) provide evidence on the effects of the programme for schools 
that because academies between school years 2002/3 and 2008/9. All these schools were 
secondary schools. They use the pupil census (the National Pupil Database) to implement a 
difference-in-differences approach. That is, they estimate the impact of academy school 
conversion on the school’s pupil intake and performance by comparing average outcomes in 
these schools relative to an appropriately defined comparison group, before and after the 
conversion took place.  They adopt a similar approach to look at the effect of academy 
school conversion on neighbouring schools.  
 
There are three main findings. First, there was a step-change in the pupil intake of schools 
after they converted to academy status. They started to attract and admit higher ability 
pupils. Second, these school also started to perform significantly better in GCSE exams (even 
accounting  for  their  improved  intake).
15  Moreover,  the  achievement  gains  were  most 
marked  in  schools  that  made  the  biggest  move  in  autonomy  (i.e.  changing  from  a 
community school to an academy, as compared to moves to academy status from being 
voluntary  controlled  or  aided,  from  being  a  foundation  school  or  from  being  a  city 
technology college). Third, neighbouring schools started to perform better even though they 
were left with a lower pupil intake. The positive impact on neighbouring schools may be 
because of increased choice and competition and/or the sharing of academy school facilities 
(and expertise) with the wider community.  
 
Thus, the idea of granting schools greater autonomy seems to have worked well in England. 
Furthermore, because the policy was initially targeted at disadvantaged areas, it has been 
an  instrument  to  reduce  attainment  gaps  along  the  socio-economic  dimension  (when 
viewed at a national level). However, one has to be careful about any projection of effects 
from a relatively small number of schools that became academies over this time period. 
Schools that are enrolling into the Academies Programme now have different characteristics 
                                                 
15 GCSE stands for General Certificate of Secondary Education. The exams are undertaken by pupils in their 
final year of compulsory schooling when they are aged 16.  13 
(e.g.  on  average  they  are  less  disadvantaged  at  baseline)  and  it  might  be  that  the 
Programme has different effects in such schools. Furthermore, concerns about the future 
include whether centrally provided services provided by Local Authorities (e.g. for students 
with special needs) will be undermined if too many schools become academies; whether 
small schools will have the people and infrastructure to cope with new responsibilities; 
whether more centralised regulation (i.e. a national Schools Commissioner rather than the 
Local Authority) will be effective in identifying and dealing with problems that might arise. A 
crucial aspect of markets that is hard to operationalize in the public sector is the exit of 
schools  (or  management)  that  are  doing  badly  for  their  students.  It  remains  difficult, 





Whereas school autonomy seems to have become a popular concept in England since 2000, 
this is not true of some aspects of school organisation. There have been very prescriptive 
measures to raise standards in literacy and numeracy via pedagogical methods. 
 
Top-down policies to influence the teaching of literacy and numeracy in primary schools 
were  first  introduced  in  the  late  1990s  to  some  Local  Education  Authorities  (LEAs)  in 
England. For the most part, these were a handful of inner city LEAs – 12 LEAs with respect to 
the ‘literacy hour’ and 13 LEAs with respect to the ‘numeracy hour’. There was very little 
geographic overlap regarding where these policies were implemented. The background to 
these initiatives was concerns about poor standards of literacy and numeracy in English 
schools.  Subsequently  both  these  policies  were  rolled  out  nationally  as  the  ‘National 
Literacy  Strategy’  and  ‘National  Numeracy  Strategy’  respectively  (in  1998  and  1999 
respectively). 
 
The core of these initiatives was a daily ‘literacy hour’ and ‘numeracy hour’ to be taught in 
primary  schools.  They  aimed  to  improve  the  quality  of  teaching  through  more  focused 
instruction and effective classroom management. Both the ‘literacy hour’ and ‘numeracy 
hour’ were supported by a framework for teaching, which sets out termly objectives for the 14 
5-11 age range and provides a practical structure of time and class management. With 
regard to the ‘literacy hour’ a range of texts were specified and teaching objects set out at 
three levels (text, sentence and word) to match the text types studied. The daily literacy 
hour was divided between 10-15 minutes of whole class reading or writing; 10-15 minutes 
whole-class session on word work (phonics, spelling and vocabulary) and sentence work 
(grammar  and  punctuation);  25-30  minutes  of  directed  group  activities  (on  aspects  of 
writing or reading) and a plenary session at the end for pupils to revisit the objectives of the 
lesson,  reflect  on  what  they  have  learnt  and consider  what  they  need  to  do  next.  The 
framework document for the ‘numeracy hour’ also contained a booklet of examplar lessons 
and training on strategies to teach mental calculation. The hour itself consisted of a three-
part template for daily mathematics lessons, starting with 10-15 minutes of oral/mental 
arithmetic practice, then direct interactive teaching of whole classes and groups, and finally 
10 minutes of plenary review.  
 
Neither the literacy nor numeracy hour represented an increase in the overall time allotted 
to teaching these subjects. But both represented a dramatic change in how these subjects 
were taught. This is explained in detail by Machin and McNally (2008) with respect to the 
literacy hour.  
 
Since the National Strategies were preceded by de facto pilot projects (although they were 
not seen to be such at the time), there has been opportunity to evaluate their effectiveness 
via a difference-in-differences strategy. That is, one can compare educational attainment at 
the end of primary school in ‘treatment schools’ to schools in an appropriately defined 
comparison group, before and after the ‘pilot’ project was introduced. Machin and McNally 
(2008)  evaluate  the  ‘literacy  hour’  using  this  methodology.
16  The  results  point  to  a 
significant impact of the literacy hour with their being a 2-3 percentage point improvement 
in the reading and English skills of primary school children affected by the introduction of 
the policy. Perhaps of most significance is that effects are generated at an extremely low 
cost per pupil. The main costs were local centres and literacy consultants in each Local 
Authority, with some funding to schools for teacher training and resources. Machin and 
McNally (2008) estimate costs of only about £25 per pupil whereas (discounted) labour 
                                                 
16 Very similar results are found for the ‘numeracy hour’ in subsequent analysis (available on request). 15 
market benefits for the improvement in reading are estimated at between £69 and £179 per 
year of working in the labour market. 
 
Although the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategies are likely to be responsible for a 
considerable proportion of the improvement in educational performance of primary schools 
in the 2000s, there is a hard core of students for whom generic pedagogical approaches are 
not sufficient. About one-fifth of students still do not attain the government targets of ‘level 
4  or  above’  by  the  end  of  primary  school  (in  the  National  Curriculum,  ‘level  4’  is  the 
expected level of knowledge and skills at this age). Another more recent initiative to try to 
address this was the ‘Every Child a Reader’ programme introduced to schools in some Local 
Authorities in the mid-late 2000s. The core of this initiative is Reading Recovery, which 
provides children in the greatest difficulty with daily one-to-one tuition for up to 20 weeks. 
The programme has been evaluated by a consortium of research institutions (Tanner et al. 
2010). The economic evaluation (by researchers at IFS
17) is also based on a difference-in-
differences methodology (as described above). They find that schools introducing the policy 
had significantly better educational attainment for children at age 7 in reading and writing 
(i.e. the end of Key Stage 1). The overall effect is similar to the ‘literacy hour’ in that it 
increases  the  proportion  of  students  achieving  the  expected  standard  by  about  2 
percentage  points.  However,  it  is  considerably  more  expensive.  The  programme  costs 
£3,000 per child in the first year and £2,600 per child thereafter. The future benefits depend 
on how long the effects endure for. The authors estimate that for the policy to break-even, 
it would have to increase the probability of obtaining better formal qualifications at age 18 
by at least 4 percentage points.  
 
Slavin et al. (2011) review a wide range of evidence on programs to help struggling readers 
(using international evidence). This includes one-to-one programmes like Reading Recovery 
but also one-to-one teaching programmes by para-professionals/volunteers;  small group 
tutorials; classroom instructional approaches; and instructional technology. The review is 
very positive about the effectiveness of programmes like Reading Recovery. The authors 
conclude that there should be a strong focus on improving classroom instruction and then 
providing one-to-one tutoring to students who continue to experience difficulties. Given the 
                                                 
17 http://www.ifs.org.uk/pr/ecar_2011.pdf 16 
likely costs involved (as documented by the IFS researchers for England) compared to the 
costs of more classroom instructional methods (like the literacy and numeracy hours), it  
would seem that the optimal programme would only implement one-to-one tuition in a 
context where classroom instructional methods had already been improved as much as 
possible. However, these more expensive programmes (if well targeted) might be especially 
helpful  for  ‘hard  to  reach’  students  who  are  not  helped  sufficiently  by  more  generic 
programmes. If they are successful, they might reduce problems much further down the line 
such as drop-out at age 16/17 (which is a bigger problem in England than in many other 
European  countries).  Another  question  is  whether  such  programmes  really  need  to  be 
prescribed  from  central  government  or  whether  they  can  be  left  to  individual  schools. 
Arguments for intervention at a central or local level are economies of scale in the provision 
of  relevant  infrastructure  (e.g.  training  programmes)  that  are  difficult  to  organize  by 
practitioners at a school level, who are mainly occupied with day-to-day activities in their 
own school. However, too much prescription (especially from a high-level of government) 
can mean that schools do not have the flexibility to adapt programmes in a suitable way for 
their own circumstances and takes away the professional autonomy sought after in other 
areas of educational policy. A more highly skilled and trained teaching workforce might 
remove the need for prescribed methods of classroom instruction. There is little research 
for England showing the importance of teacher quality because the relevant data is not 
made  available  to  researchers  (and  not  collected  at  classroom  level).
18  However,  the 
importance of teacher quality is well illustrated in other countries such as for the US. For 
example, Rivkin et al. (2002) show that having a teacher at the higher end of the quality 
distribution  is  very  important  for  raising  student  achievement.  However,  the  cost  of 
recruiting,  retaining  and  on-going  training  of  teachers  is  expensive.  Furthermore,  a 
consequence of the increase in graduate opportunities over recent decades (especially for 
women) is that it is more difficult to attract and retain high qualified people in teaching.  
 
 
                                                 
18 While the new School Workforce Census will certainly help researchers, it is still the case that teachers are 





In this paper, we began by describing educational inequalities that appear at all stages in the 
lifecycle and used this as a motivation for then discussing evaluation of various school-level 
policies in England. It is clear that educational attainment gaps along various dimensions are 
evident from the earliest time these are measured and throughout the lifecycle. Of special 
concern for social mobility is the gap according to family background. We therefore review 
various school-level policies that have been implemented in England where there is at least 
some economic evaluation of a high standard, with the aim of seeing how they have scope 
to  impinge  on  educational  inequalities.  We  are  necessarily  selective  and  consider 
evaluations  in  the  areas  of  school  resources,  market  incentives,  school  autonomy  and 
pedagogical approaches in turn.  
 
There have been several recent studies about the effects of school resources on educational 
attainment.  Quite  often,  they  find  evidence  of  a  modest  effect  of  school  resources  on 
educational attainment. The exception is the recent study by Gibbons et al. (2011), which 
suggests larger effects. This study applies to schools in urban areas and is of particular 
interest because of the larger proportion of disadvantaged students in these areas. In fact, 
several  of  these  studies  suggest  that  expenditure  effects  are  larger  for  economically 
disadvantaged  students.  This  suggests  that  school  resource  policies  can  help  to  reduce 
attainment gaps by family background (especially if deliberately introduced to do so). This is 
good news for the Pupil Premium policy, although worrying because school expenditure will 
fall in real terms for most schools. 
 
The evidence for the effects of choice and competition suggests that higher socio-economic 
groups  benefit  more  from  school  choice  and  competition  does  not  seem  to  raise 
educational standards. However, this might be because many schools have not had enough 
flexibility to respond to competitive pressures. The evidence on school autonomy (i.e. in the 
context of ‘the academies programme’) suggests that this produced positive educational 
achievement gains both for participating schools and their neighbours in the areas where 18 
they were first introduced. It can be viewed as a policy with some redistributive effects 
because academies were first introduced to disadvantaged areas. However, the early effects 
of academies cannot be extrapolated to a much bigger programme that no longer targets 
particular areas. The expansion of the programme presents new challenges – for example 
for monitoring and accountability; for small schools; for services traditionally provided by 
Local Authorities to all schools in their area. 
 
Pedagogical  approaches  have  been  shown  to  be  important  for  improving  educational 
attainment.  Classroom  instructional  methods  (as  manifest  in  the  National  Literacy  and 
Numeracy Strategies) can be extremely cost-effective. However, they will not necessarily be 
enough to lift the performance of hard-to-reach children. If we are serious about improving 
the prospects of these children, then programmes like Reading Recovery may be necessary. 
Although they are expensive, they have been shown to be effective and may be important 
for reducing serious problems down the line such reducing the number of people who are 
‘not in education, training or employment’ at a young age. The need to actually prove such 
effects (to help future investment decisions) is why longitudinal studies and high quality 
economic evaluation should remain high on the policy agenda.  
 
Finally,  it  is  worth  remarking  that  England  offers  a  useful  setting  for  an  appraisal  of 
evaluations of education policies, due to the quest for evidence based policy formation and 
because of the large number of policies that have been implemented. However, the policies 
that seem to work best are those where a need or intervention can be identified (e.g. 
because things are not working properly) and so one needs to be careful to recognise that 
their scope to generate educational improvements is often place and context specific. There 
is therefore a need to be very careful indeed if one wishes to try to generalise the results 
from economic evaluations of education policies like the ones described in this paper  to 
other settings. 19 
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Notes: Source is OECD (2011), Education at a Glance, Paris. The Figure shows the score point difference in reading performance associated with one unit increase in the 
PISA index of economic, social and cultural status. Mean reading scores are shown by country names (the standardised mean across all PISA countries is 500, with standard 
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Notes: From Eurostat (2009) based upon EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data. The Figure excludes former Eastern European countries and 
countries  for  which  data  was  described  as  provisional  or  unreliable.  ISCED  0-2  is  completion  of  pre-primary,  primary  or  upper  secondary  education,  ISCED  3-4  is 
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Notes: Source is OECD (2011). Data is for 2007 for most countries. Exceptions are: 2005 (US); 2006 (FI, FR, IT, NZ, PO, UK); 2008 (BE, CA, CZ, DK, IR, NL); 2009 
(CH). ISCED 0-2 is completion of pre-primary, primary or upper secondary education, ISCED 3-4 is completion of upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education 
and ISCED 5-6 is completion of tertiary education. 
 
 




Table 1:  
Age 5 Differences in Vocabulary Tests by Gender and Ethnicity, Millennium Cohort Study 
 
Ethnic Group  Boys  Girls 
     
White British  55.9  56.5 
Black, Caribbean  48.4*  51.0* 
Black, Other  44.2*  47.2* 
Bangladeshi  40.4*  41.7* 
Pakistani  40.6*  40.7* 
Indian  49.8*  50.3* 
Chinese  41.2*  55.2 
     
Number of Children  4,587  4,452 
     
 
Notes: Based on Table 3 of Dustmann, Machin and Schonberg (2010). The vocabulary test is standardised to have mean 50 and a standard 
deviation of 10. A * denotes statistically significant differences relative to White British boys or girls respectively. 
 